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Abstract
This essay prods moral philosophy towards more explicit attention to the political constructions of
injustice. I do not appeal to practical or political relevance, but advance a particular kind of
constructivist interpretation of moral argumentation (constructivism+) in which our interpretive
horizons are extended to include the implicit views of social action, broadly construed—from the
macro- to the micro-social, and from the past to the present and the possible—built into
philosophical arguments. I challenge the idea that, in order to oppose injustice, we must first
articulate and justify a coherent conception of justice and then theorize the social, constitutional,
legal, or cultural arrangements through which such justice could be implemented. My argument
moves through three levels: 1. contesting the separability of these steps by demonstrating that
views of social action are embedded in, not merely derivable from, the well-known formulations
of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. (Thus reconstructed, Rawls is more coherent than most
moral philosophers have considered him to be); 2. giving priority to moral justification while
leaving the social context in the background, scarcely analyzed, burdens our thinking about
in/justice; 3. in order to oppose injustice, it is not the case that we must first articulate and justify
a coherent conception of justice.

Introduction and self-positioning
Moral philosophy has traditionally positioned itself at some distance from the problem of
counteracting actually experienced injustice. Real-world compliance is often defined to be
outside the ambit of ideal moral theory. There are, of course, counter-currents, such as feminist
analyses of real-life ethical issues (e.g., Holmes and Purdy 1992), which highlight practical
relevance and support struggle aimed at limiting the powerful in their making and breaking of
social rules. In this essay I also prod moral philosophy towards more explicit attention to the
political constructions of injustice, but by a less direct path than appealing to practical or political
relevance. I advance a particular kind of constructivist interpretation of moral argumentation,
which leads me through three levels of argument to challenge a position that may seem
obviously true, namely, that in order to oppose injustice, we must first articulate and justify a
coherent conception of justice.
Let me refer to what I question as two-step moral theory. Whenever a set of fundamental
principles is formulated from which justice can be derived and justified, a second step is implied,
namely, theorizing the social, constitutional, legal, or cultural arrangements through which such
justice could be implemented. Although we could challenge moral philosophy's emphasis of the
first step over the second, my first level of argument will contest the very separability of these
steps. I develop my argument by considering a key work of a dominant figure in moral theory,
John Rawls. I demonstrate that views of social action are embedded in, not merely derivable
from, his well-known formulations in A Theory of Justice (TJ) (Rawls 1971). Rawls in TJ—and
two-step moral theory in general—should not be taken just literally. Instead, we should extend
our interpretive horizons to include the implicit views of social action, broadly construed—from
the macro- to the micro-social, and from the past to the present and the possible—built into
philosophical arguments. I call this interpretive position constructivism+ (“constructivism plus”). A
reconstructed Rawls is more coherent than most moral philosophers have considered him to be.
As we shall see, however, my reconstructed Rawls is not fully coherent. This provides an
entry point into the second level of argument: giving priority to moral justification while leaving the
social context in the background, scarcely analyzed, burdens our thinking about in/justice. The
third level of argument follows: in order to oppose injustice, it is not the case that we must first
articulate and justify a coherent conception of justice. A fourth level of argument would be to
present a complete constructivist+ account of how to counteract actually experienced injustice.
This level, however, lies beyond the scope of my essay. Yet, even without that level, I hope to
have indicated the necessity for reconfiguring the project of moral philosophy.
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Constructivism+, to be consistent, must be applicable to its proponents' own arguments.
Let me help readers begin to develop an interpretation of the social location of my project here by
giving a sense of its history and motivations, and of my intended relation to the essay’s
audiences. My formal introduction to moral philosophy, a faculty seminar on "Global Environment
and International Justice,” is recent, and it was as a discussion paper for that seminar that this
essay was drafted. I deliberately position myself here as an outsider and newcomer, whose
naivete might protect him from being drawn inside a picture that holds career moral philosophers
captive (to borrow an image from Wittgenstein). I enjoy having an outsider’s freedom to write
without attending to the fine points of argument and counter-argument in the literature. (Notice
the absence of footnotes and the small number of parenthetical asides.) This expository position
should ensure my accessibility to non-specialists; I hope my reconstruction of TJ will speak more
directly and concretely than most accounts to their concerns about injustice. My intention,
however, is also to address specialists, an audience who I hope will be challenged both by the
coherence of my reconstructed Rawls and by my critique of two-step moral theory.
Of course, in the eyes of specialists, the freedom of being an outsider and a newcomer
brings serious disadvantages: a lack of engagement with the intellectual and professional
activities of the discipline; inevitable overgeneralizations and inexpert use of terms; and an
inability to elaborate a replacement philosophy of justice. Some readers might see room for
themselves to thresh out my arguments and weave selected pieces of them into their own work.
In light of my disadvantages, however, most specialists will be inclined to discount this
intervention. They might see it simply as a colonizing attempt by a constructivist from another
field, namely, social studies of science, or, perhaps as an attempt by a political activist turned
academic to achieve some sense of command of the world by puzzling out issues until the
pieces can be fitted together in a way that makes sense—in short, to find some satisfaction in
philosophy. While these last two readings would not be unjustified, they nevertheless reinforce
the central contention of this paper. Representations can be more richly interpreted by paying
attention to the authors’ embedded views of their action in the world.
1. Contesting the separability of moral justification and social context
1.1. From constructivism to constructivism+
A convenient route for me to begin to develop a constructivist+ perspective and its
implications is opened up by the distinction between natural and constructivist theories of justice
(see Dworkin [1973], 1989, p.28 ff). Taking the conventional scientific method as a model, natural
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accounts seek a firm foundation in the observed world, where the observations here consist of
intuitions about widely accepted moral standards. Principles underlying those intuitions are
proposed, their consequences deduced, and, if discrepancies or contradictions between those
consequences and subsequent observations emerge, deeper principles need to be discovered to
restore coherence—just as Einstein proposed relativity to resolve problems in the accounts of
classical physics.
Constructivist theories, on the other hand, seek coherence without postulating the
existence of moral bedrock. Moral observations or intuitions are not sufficient, by themselves, to
justify the theory proposed. Instead, any new interpretation of justice, developed, say, in
response to new circumstances or challenges, is constructed from principles underlying previous
theories, analogous to the use of precedents in law. (Notice that two different senses of the word
construction are implicated here, namely, building and interpretation.) Moreover, the
modifications and extensions must be made in a way that can be justified to the community of
concern. Attention to this context of reception, together with coherence, characterize
constructivism.
At one level the natural/constructivist distinction is not significant; the difference in
practice is negligible and the formulations can be readily inter-translated. For example, if the
community of concern is seen as the community of other moral philosophers, then both schools
seek to articulate a set of fundamental principles and reasoning that support the rules making up
the theory of justice being proposed. Appeals to intuitions about widely accepted moral standards
are made in both cases; for the natural theorist and constructivist alike the "wide acceptance"
implies a community that shares their concerns.
At another level, however, the distinction is significant. Natural theory directs our attention
inwards to the foundational moral observations, while the constructivist perspective opens our
view outwards. The constructivist emphasis on justifying a theory to a community readily leads us
to admit that the descriptions of moral observations or fundamental principles are not innocent.
Instead, descriptions are formulated or reconstrued with a view to justifying by deduction or
derivation the theory of justice already in mind, at least in broad outline. The context of reception
also enters in the imperative to build on precedents. The practice of building on precedents is not
a natural route to coherence, but relies on acknowledging that the community to be convinced
has already a sense of reliable knowledge, familiar categories, and plausible beliefs. To carry
that community along to a new consensus it is a matter of practicality, not a logical or natural
necessity, that modifications should build upon the existing structure. (That is not, of course, to
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deny that some dismantling and reconstruction of that structure may also be required—
questioning what is plausible, undermining what is reliable, and reshaping distinctions.)
At this point, the constructivist perspective can be readily extended. Once we
acknowledge philosophers' active role in shaping arguments in order to move some community,
why not analyze the rhetorical strategies employed? For example, consider the natural theorists'
rhetoric. Moral intuitions, they claim, form observations upon which an objective theory can be
built. These theorists know that their argument depends on some community accepting those
intuitions, but they can push this conditionality out of view by inventing the idea that the
fundamental principles of their theory are universal or given by nature. Rhetorical analysis, once
begun, requires us to distrust the literal version of an argument and to include in addition how the
selection of relevant considerations relates to the context of the philosopher-rhetoricians and
their audiences. Of course, for an audience of philosophers, the context seems to be dominated
by the contemporary analytical problems and debates in terms given by the history of the field.
Yet—and this is the case even for an audience of philosophers—there is a background of
unspoken or unexamined factors against which any audience experiences arguments and
evaluates them as valid, clear, interesting, and so on. Coherence for some audience derives not
only from the structure of the argument, but also from the background they share with the
philosopher.
The warrant to examine the situated construction of philosophical rhetoric does not,
however, indicate how we might go about doing this, nor how it helps us to make sense of Rawls.
Let me postpone these questions one paragraph longer, while I extend the constructivist
perspective yet further.
By opening up our interpretations, at least in principle, to incorporate implicit and takenfor-granted considerations, we have rendered problematic the conventional boundaries of moral
philosophical discourse. Following the constructivist line leads us to note that, when philosophers
are constructing their arguments with the community they strive to convince in mind (consciously
or otherwise), they are also rhetorically constructing that very community. Moral philosophers
give the appearance of addressing other philosophers—to whom else would the obtuse technical
terms, e.g., “The Difference Principle,” and detailed exegeses of arguments be intelligible? Yet
there are, of course, much broader communities, consisting of people on whose behalf the moral
philosophers undertake their work of reasoning, people who, in turn, the philosophers hope to
influence with tightly justified rules of justice. What renders arguments, or, more importantly,
conclusions plausible to members of those extended communities? What background elements
of the wider society are thus implicated in the philosophers' building of arguments?
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These questions take us into the realm of social constructivisms. The plural is important
because, at least in the interpretation of science, construction is construed in several ways
(Sismondo 1993). The relativist position that representations of reality are mere social
constructions is only one variant. In fact, hoping to avoid any automatic association of my
arguments with relativism, I will use here the term constructivism+. What I draw from social
constructivism is the sociological perspective that representations of the nature of things are
bound together with interventions in social worlds (Clarke 1991), arenas of discourse and action
encompassing the particular work situation, the relevant scholarly communities, and the different
arenas of sponsorship and reception. The coherence of ideas making up some theory cannot be
disentangled from the feasibility or desirability of actions that follow from and, in turn, reinforce
those ideas (Taylor 1992, 1995).
1.2. A reconstruction+ of Rawls, phase 1
To apply a constructivist+ perspective to Rawls in TJ requires reinterpretation of his work
so as to include reference to its social background. Moreover, given that I want to engage an
audience interested in moral philosophy, this interpretation should provide greater coherence
than previous constructions of TJ undertaken within moral philosophy. My reconstruction is
separated into two phases. First, I focus on Rawls' general framework in TJ, including his rules of
justice. Once I have made plausible the idea that Rawls' framework in TJ builds on implicit
references to unstated background social considerations, I can then more easily interpret the
more complex and difficult derivation and moral underpinnings of his framework.
I should emphasize that my interpretation is quite provisional, subject to reworking after
further research into Rawls' social location over the period in which he developed the framework
in TJ. But, for this essay, I do not have to claim that my interpretation of TJ is the unique, correct
and complete one. My argument is that there is no a priori reason to read TJ (and moral theory
more generally) literally; all I need to do to establish that is possible to render plausible one
potential social constructivist interpretation of TJ. The onus is then on those who want to interpret
moral philosophical arguments without reference to unstated background social elements; they
have to establish that this and any other constructivist+ accounts can be replaced by one that is
more coherent and still purely internal.
Let me begin my first phase by reinterpreting Rawls' stated method of achieving a
coherent conception of justice. Rawls advocates that we move back and forward between our
considered convictions about justice and fundamental principles that yield rules of justice,
revising the convictions and the principles until the convictions and the rules coincide, a state he
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calls reflective equilibrium (TJ, 19 ff). Undoubtedly Rawls uses some method of reflection and
modification but, I propose, his convictions and principles are not so tightly circumscribed.
As I have depicted in figure 1, the process of reflection and modification can be
reconstrued as extending well into the social realm (region A). In fact, Rawls' reflection and
modification appears to be grounded in a central observation, namely, that the existing system is
characterized by large inequalities of wealth (or, more generally, possession and access to
resources) that allow the wealthy (resource-rich) to perpetuate inequality (point A1). An obvious
way for rules of justice to have a role in transforming this system is for the rules to endorse some
redistribution of historically generated inequalities. This specification for a theory of justice follows
from the observation that in past and present societies the wealthy have been able to exert
disproportionate influence on social decisions and, in general, privilege themselves and their
heirs in social transactions. From the same observation it also follows for Rawls that large
inequalities cannot be allowed to re-accumulate after any redistribution. This necessitates some
equalizing action to compensate for any future inherited inequalities. These two specifications
constitute point B, which in turn constrain the moral philosophical framework Rawls develops
(point C). Other aspects of the social background also give shape to his framework, as shall
emerge shortly.
In the tradition of two-step moral theory, however, a framework must be built in which the
desired rules appear to be derived from more fundamental principles. In other words, the
direction of construction in my interpretation (A->B->C or A->C) is reversed in moral theoretical
rhetoric so that point C appears based on some point D. Rawls' TJ presents one version of his
framework and its derivation from fixed points (i.e., principles that Rawls claims are widely
accepted) and other considered convictions. In other versions of Rawls' work, however, his
framework and its derivation differ significantly (see Barry 1989, 320ff), but the rules of justice
remain relatively unchanged. We could interpret this discrepancy internally to moral philosophy,
claiming merely that Rawls changes his analysis to answer better the objections of critics.
Nevertheless, the fact that Rawls' derivation can vary while his rules remain invariant confers
some plausibility on the direction of derivation I proposed above (A->B->C).
At the same time, however, the variability of Rawls' frameworks among different versions
means we need additional reasons to account for the particular framework advanced in TJ. The
framework in TJ may be summarized as the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance, plus a
concern not to generate intolerable Strains of Commitment, and rules of justice consisting of the
Priority of Liberty, Equality of Opportunity and the Difference Principle. I want to be charitable to
Rawls, that is, to assume that his account has an underlying coherence. (This does not mean
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Figure 1. Extending Rawls’ process of reflection and modification (between C and D) into the
social realm.
that I must restrict my interpretations to what Rawls literally says; this would constitute an
interpretive positivism. Issues and terms, therefore, given to Rawls by the history of moral
philosophy and its contemporary debates, are relevant to our interpretation, but should not
exclude other themes.) In this spirit of seeking coherence, we can interpret each element of
Rawls' framework by paying attention to existing social arrangements and processes (i.e., the
path from A->C) while still respecting the philosophical requirement of a logical structure of
argumentation.
The Original Position (OP) corresponds to a requirement that institutions of social justice
be established (at least in broad outline) in an initial contract and not subject to repeated
renegotiation in conflictual circumstances. (By analogy with interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States, the OP provides a strict constructionism.) The social understanding embodied
here is that some parties to any current dispute will have a negotiating advantage (born of
greater information, power etc.) and, moreover, that the choices presented in particular situations
can be too narrow to permit justice—preparatory action is needed to ensure the possibility of
justice. For example, some corporations are giving women between menarche and menopause
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the choice of sterilization or losing their jobs. In formal terms the women are free to choose
sterilization or not, but, given their economic circumstances, the choice is made under duress.
The choice could become less constrained only if, well in advance, there had been developed a
countervailing power to the corporations' prerogative to determine the availability, range, and
conditions of employment opportunities.
The Veil of Ignorance is readily interpreted as a means of blanking out interests born of
historically generated and current advantages. This element is needed because, whatever we
believe about the relative influence of self-interest and moral motivations on the actions of
individuals, we know that, at least for now, social life resounds with the pursuit and defense of
interests—community, corporate, and national—against the conflicting interests of others.
The Priority of Liberty over material concerns or welfare constrains the transactions
governed by Equality of Opportunity and the Difference Principle. Notice first that welfare is
central to Rawls’ thinking: almost all of his formulations are in terms of the welfare of the different
parties; he considers the “worth of liberty” (i.e., the welfare accruing from liberty, see TJ, 204-5);
and he does allow liberty to be constrained at least in order to achieve a minimum level of
welfare. So why could he not allow liberty to be totally foregone in favor of welfare? One
interpretation stems from Rawls coming to maturity with the defeat of fascism and under the
specter of communism. Recall that fascist and totalitarian systems have at times proved quite
successful at raising social welfare, and, moreover, have sometimes done so with less inequality
of distribution than evidenced in systems guaranteeing greater personal liberty. The Priority of
Liberty was originally needed, therefore, for Rawls to maintain his philosophical distance from
such systems; it has been retained since.
Equal Opportunity and the Difference Principle (DP) form a complementary compensatory
pair, each constituting a safeguard if the other does not operate reliably. Suppose that, in each
generation during people's upbringing, opportunities to develop talents were equalized (Equal
Opportunity) so that inherited advantages were discounted before people commenced
transactions as adults. The strict constraints on transactions ensured by the DP, namely, that
only those transactions benefitting the least well-off be allowed, would then hardly be necessary.
Similarly, if (after some initial redistribution) the DP operated consistently, large inequalities
would probably be slow to accumulate and so compensation against inherited advantages would
be less necessary.
In any case, whether on their own or as part of this pair, the two principles follow readily
from social observations: The wealthy do provide their heirs with greater educational
opportunities and more lucrative employment opportunities. So, if inequality is not to be self-

9

perpetuating, Equal Opportunity is needed to discount inherited advantages. Given the tendency
of wealth to breed more wealth and poverty more poverty, Rawls has to temper in some way the
effects of inequality in current transactions. The principle of maximizing utility (in its pure form)
does not address the issue of inequality, so a different principle is needed. The wealthy cannot
be relied upon to use their power to divide the cake fairly. So, leave it to someone acting on
behalf of the most disadvantaged (if not the disadvantaged themselves) to decide whether some
transaction tempers inequality—in short, follow the Difference Principle.
Finally, Rawls' concern not to generate intolerable Strains of Commitment by citizens to
the system of injustice tacitly acknowledges the resistance of the wealthy to constraints on their
power. In the other components of Rawls' framework there is no logical limit to redistribution and
to measures to ensure Equality of Opportunity (except if it can be argued that some measure
violates individual liberty). Considerations of Strains of Commitment serve to moderate (to a
somewhat arbitrary degree) the unconstrained application of the other rules of justice. Although
Rawls speaks of Strains of Commitment for the general person, the greatest risk to the
implementation of these rules is that wealthy people would not abide by them. It is this risk that
he is tacitly moderating, and in doing so the difficulty of implementation or transformation—a
feature of the non-ideal realm Rawls' claimed to exclude from his analysis—clearly enters his
theory.
1.3. Taking stock of where we have got to
At this point I have introduced in broad outline a reinterpretation of the general framework
derived in Rawls' TJ. By no means has every aspect of this work been rendered coherent by
extending the referents outwards to implicit aspects of the social realm. I have yet to discuss the
arguments in support of this framework which make up the bulk of Rawls' presentation (D->C in
figure 1). On the other hand, within moral philosophy there exist hundreds of critical accounts
and revisions of Rawls' arguments within moral philosophy (Daniels [1975], 1989). Other moral
theorists have claimed, for example, that the Difference Principle would not be chosen by
participants in the Original Position (Lyons [1973, 1989]) or that liberty and welfare should be
jointly subject to the Difference Principle. By departing from strictly moral philosophical terms,
however, my reconstruction affirms the coherence of Rawls' framework.
What, it may be asked, is the value of seeking a coherent interpretation of Rawls,
especially since my attempt to give coherence to Rawls involves me departing significantly from
what Rawls literally says? Moreover, what is the value of coherence of Rawls' general framework
alone, when TJ is much more, namely, an elaborate derivation of that framework? How can we
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make sense of all the detail of that derivation? Why not stay within the confines of moral
philosophy, dispute and revise Rawls' arguments, and, on the terms in which it was stated,
attempt to build a better framework?
My response has two thrusts: 1) If Rawls' theory can be given coherence by referring to
implicit background social considerations, then, in principle, any moral philosophical framework is
open to a constructivist+ interpretation. The conventional boundary of moral philosophical
interpretation (enclosing points C, D, and sometimes B in figure 1) should no longer be assumed,
but must be justified, and even that justification is open to reinterpretation. 2) Constructivist+
reinterpretation abandons the pretense that issues of justice can be resolved by abstract
philosophical arguments that make scant reference to social considerations. As a consequence
of moving beyond abstract, asocial arguments, more concrete and direct statements about
justice can be made. Table 1, which summarizes my reinterpretation of Rawls thus far, would be
readily accessible to a non-specialist inquiring about Rawls' principles (and, given the topic of the
faculty seminar in which this essay arose, about their relevance to justice among nations).
Table 1.

Summary of reinterpretation of Rawls' framework.

Element of framework

Reinterpretation

Original Position

Institutions of justice once established are not subject to repeated
renegotiation in conflictual circumstances [1].

Veil of Ignorance

Blank out interests born of historically generated and current
advantages [2].

Priority of Liberty

No tradeoff between liberty and welfare (contra totalitarian and fascist
systems) [3].

Equal Opportunity &

Each is a safeguard in case the other is not operating reliably.

Difference Principle

EO: Discount historically given advantages in current transactions [4].
DP: Temper transactions so that wealth and poverty are not selfreinforcing. Allow someone acting on behalf of the poorest to decide
what measures are acceptable.

Strains of Commitment

Moderate the unconstrained application of the preceding principles to
reduce the risk of the wealthy and powerful undermining them.

Notes (mostly in relation to international justice)
1. Consistent rule of international law, instead of "Might makes Right."
2. Also geographically given advantages.
3. Transactions, e.g., investment, cannot be conditional on suppression of political rights.
4. Also geographically given advantages.
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Stated so baldly, Rawls' rules of justice, it may be objected, can seem reasonable and
even desirable, but are still in need of greater justification. Let us delve deeper, therefore, into
Rawls' theory to consider the foundation he builds for his framework. Here, however, a
constructivist+ perspective will lead to a much less generous assessment of Rawls' coherence.
1.4. Rawls' reconstruction+, phase 2
Two central components of Rawls' derivation of his framework concern me here, one
explicit and the other less so: 1) Self-interested participants in the Original Position would, Rawls
argues in TJ, if sheltered behind a Veil of Ignorance, choose Equal Liberty, Equality of
Opportunity, and the Difference Principle as their rules of justice, and give Priority to Liberty; 2) In
order to use the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance as a means of deriving rules of
justice, the (hypothetical) participants must give equal concern and respect to the other
participants (Dworkin [1973], 1989, 46ff).
The second component constitutes a deep premise of equality (point E in figure 2). From
this premise it follows that advantages obtained prior to making agreements in the Original
Position cannot be assumed, whether these are historically given advantages or derive from
inborn (pre-social) talents. This denial of natural merit (i.e., of claims to benefits not pre-agreed
to) forms one of Rawls' considered convictions (point D). Equality becomes the benchmark; the
only acceptable inequalities are those that benefit everyone's long term prospects (the Difference
Principle).
Both these components—self-interested individuals in the Original Position and equal
concern and respect—are necessary for Rawls to derive his framework. In important respects,
however, they work at cross purposes. We need to make sense of their coexistence in Rawls'
theory. Coherence can be given to these two components; in doing so, however, progressively
more serious incoherencies will be exposed.
The first component constitutes an argument of so-called rational choice, wherein
reasons must be couched in terms of self-interest. Rawls does not want his rules of justice to be
based on assuming widespread altruism (TJ, 188ff) because they would be vulnerable to the
possibility of some people free-riding on the altruism of others. The second component, on the
other hand, constitutes a strong assumption of moral motivation, that is, "the desire to be able to
justify one's actions to others on grounds which they could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon 1982,
116). The second component is a morality that cannot be equated with self-interest; in fact, equal
respect is readily seen as a check on the motive of self-interest. By implicitly including a moral
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Figure 2. Extending Rawls’ process of reflection and modification (between C, D, and E) into the
social realm through interpretations (dashed lines) described in the text.
motive at the base of his derivation, Rawls undermines the assumption that self-interest would
govern the hypothetical contractual position, the Original Position. But once this assumption is
loosened, the Veil of Ignorance need no longer be so strict and Rawls' derivation unravels. He
cannot overcome the problem by dispensing with the moral component of his theory, because
self-interest alone is insufficient to establish Rawls' framework of justice (Barry 1989).
This is an uneasy combination for Rawls to have as the foundation for his theory. In fact,
our difficulties in reconstructing Rawls are now even greater. As Rawls hints towards the end of
TJ, equal respect for others is not so much an assumption as a "natural completion" (TJ, 509) of
his theory, an ethic that would develop among people working according to his rules of justice.
Why, we might ask, does Rawls not admit openly this ethic-building motive, instead of smuggling
equal respect in at the "foundation" of his theory? Furthermore, once he acknowledged that he
wanted to build an ethic that is new, or at least one that is not currently central to our dominant
social institutions, why not set his sights higher? Why not work towards an ethic of responsibility,
in which people view talents as giving them the responsibility to employ them productively,
without the need for material incentives? In fact, why does he even need to accept inequalities
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that benefit everyone's long term prospects (his Difference Principle)? Why not derive egalitarian
rules of justice from a deep premise of equality?
Some coherence can be restored to Rawls' two-part foundation for his theory if we turn
our attention again to the social background. The wealthy have power to perpetuate inequalities
in wealth (point A1). They can promote institutions that they do not have to justify on grounds that
the less well off "could not reasonably reject." If morality is to be a resource for transforming this
situation and checking the power and wealth of the wealthy, a powerful morality must be built.
Equal respect and concern is the morality Rawls chooses for the job. Similarly, the denial of
claims to benefits from historically given advantages or "inborn" talents, which follows from the
deep premise of equality, makes some sense in the light of the same transformative project.
Points D and E are thus connected to the central aspect I have identified in the social
background, point A1.
This transformative project is a difficult one, potentially opposed by the wealthy. In my
constructivist+ interpretation this leads Rawls to invoke considerations of Strains of Commitment,
and it also enables us to understand why Rawls derives the Difference Principle and not
egalitarianism from his deep premise of equality. Rawls believes, as do the vast majority of his
society, that material incentives are necessary and of prime importance for ensuring that we put
our talents to productive use. The plausibility of the Difference Principle is enhanced if we "see
life's values primarily in terms of ownership and consumption" (Watt 1988, 6). The weight given
in economics and popular social theory to material incentives also leads Rawls, the moral
philosopher, to highlight the rational choice/self-interest component of his derivation over the
deep moral foundation.
Some coherence has been restored to Rawls' theory by referring to more of its implicit
social background, but a deeper incoherence has now opened up. If Rawls' project is
transformative, and building a new ethic of equal respect is central to this project, then why
proceed as if a theory of justice can be built upwards from fundamental, widely accepted moral
principles? If social background is connected into moral philosophical theorizing, perhaps even
grounding it, why construct arguments as if questions of justice can be posed and answered in
reference to a foundation of "some extra contextual, ahistorical, non-situational reality, or rule, or
law, or value" (Fish 1989, 344)? Why not dispense with two-step rhetoric and instead tackle the
difficult theoretical and methodological challenge of analyzing the web of social and moral crossconnections that I have just begun to draw attention to in this section (see figure 2)?
Again, ironically, a contribution to explaining the two-step structure can be made by
referring to the social background of Rawls' work, in this case the more direct context of the
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immediate audience Rawls' writes for, namely, Anglo-American philosophers. This is an
audience with a long tradition of appealing to the common experience of like-minded people,
usually men of the same station in life (as became central to seventeenth century natural
philosophy; Dear 1991). The complex interconnections making up social and economic
arrangements are filtered out in favor of abstract and unspecific propositions. Analyses of
philosophical arguments of previous centuries are considered more important than examination
of historical changes in meaning (Williams 1983; some relevant exceptions are Hacking 1975,
who analyzes change in the very meaning of meaning, and MacIntyre 1984, whose argument
centers on historical changes in what it means to do philosophy). Given the discipline's
adherence to this tradition of universal, timeless issues it makes pragmatic sense for a
professional philosopher to employ two-step tropes, whether in natural or constructivist guise,
when constructing an argument about justice.
Interlude: Constructivism+ in relation to other Critiques within Moral Philosophy
The constructivist+ interpretation I have been developing is broadly sympathetic with
feminist formulations of moral theory (Card 1991, Kittay and Meyers 1987), with post-modern,
anti-foundationalist critiques of moral theory (Engelhardt 1989), and with feminist ethical
analyses of real-life issues (mentioned in the introduction). Each of these forms of critique
incorporates constructivist references to social background. Feminist moral theory finds male
bias in the foundations of conventional theory. The post-modern argument that moral foundations
cannot be universal is primarily made on philosophical grounds, but subsequently interprets
claims for universality as privileging some particular social group or moral community. And,
likewise, feminist analysts of real-life ethics are being constructivists when they argue that
applications of moral principles should be situational, requiring a great deal of attention to social
conditions (Purdy 1992).
A thoroughgoing constructivism+ differs, however, from each of these critiques in
interpreting moral foundations, principles, and applications to be jointly constructed, in which the
content and weight of each level is influenced by the social background of the particular moral
philosophical project. Feminist moral theory has in general been motivated by and drawn critical
insight from opposition to the male domination of society and of the profession of philosophy.
But, more than this, its alternative foundations, such as, caring and interdependency among
people, has been most plausible to those who have this oppositional orientation and promote the
values traditionally or rhetorically associated with women, such as attention to relationships. The
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receptivity of post-modernists to pluralism in moral principles and to standpoint relativity of
applications, and the emphasis of certain feminists on specific applications rather than abstract
foundational argument both invite social interpretation as well, although generalizing about the
social background of these projects in more difficult.
A further development in the constructivist perspective follows from the multiplication of
connections among foundations, principles, applications, and social background that began to
appear in the previous sections (see figure 2). On one hand, an idea of direct causality of ideas is
connoted by the links drawn in figures 1 and 2, the emphasis on society-writ-large, and the
language used in my interpretations of Rawls: Because Rawls wanted, I proposed, to distance
his project from fascism and communism he insisted on the Priority of Liberty; liberty could not be
foregone or denied in return for greater welfare. On the other hand, a less direct view of causality
of ideas is suggested by the multiplication of connections, by invoking of society at more microlevels, e.g., of a person making a career in philosophy, and by the tensions displayed among
various elements of Rawls' project. Developing this second emphasis, constructivists+ might talk
less of causes and influences and instead of heterogeneous resources (Latour 1987, Taylor
1995) that are harnessed to support a theory of a course of action—citations, reputations of
colleagues, authority of the classics, metaphors, logical tightness of argument, funding, rhetorical
devices, career considerations, and so on.
My original interpretive proposition, that views of social actions are built into philosophical
arguments, can now be re-expressed: Philosophers are always acting or intervening in multilevelled social worlds when they construct their representations, and thus views of possible or
desired social action are woven into these representation-interventions. The actions facilitating
and facilitated by the problems chosen, the categories used, the relations inferred, the evidence
required, and so on invites analysis and interpretation. To propose, in contrast, that the
harnessing of resources does not affect the content of theories, becomes a strong claim, obliging
the claimant, I believe, to demonstrate that no changes in the resources would have produced a
significantly different theory.
The specter of relativism haunts social constructivisms, even though there is nothing in
the idea of heterogeneous construction that implies all networks (Latour 1987) or webs (Taylor
1995) of resources are equally strong or coherent. It is the case, however, that the greater the
complexity we discern these webs to have, the more difficult the analysis of their causal structure
(Taylor 1992, 1995). No one resource in a construction stands alone; each tends to reinforce or
link to others. Together with the contingency and particularity, sometimes idiosyncrasy, of any
web supporting a theory or action, this difficulty of analysis invites, for those so inclined, a
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relativist stance. However, it is possible to adopt a non-relativist approach to social
constructivism, although the practice of this is not well developed. We can, in a thought
experiment or in actuality, consider the practical implications of a critic or opponent attempting to
modify or dispute the connections making up a theory/action supporting web (Taylor 1992, 1995).
In this manner we can expose the resources involved, and their relative weight and interrelations. The way we are able to conduct the thought experiment or the actual intervention
depends on our own web of resources, and once we acknowledge our own standpoint, or take
stock of our web (Taylor 1990), we can hardly persist in giving equal credence to all theories or
action. The objection that no one theory or action can be proven decisively to all parties to be
strongest or most coherent loses weight, remaining relevant only to the extent that we attempt to
discount or deny our dependency on particular other social actors for acceptance or
implementation of our theory or course of action. I will return to this point in the conclusion, but
now let me return to my interpretation of moral theory.
2. The burdens of moral justification
My reconstruction+ of Rawls' TJ has led us to a place where questions can be raised that
challenge moral theory more generally. The inferred justification for foundationalist rhetoric given
before the interlude, namely, the power of traditional expectations of the discipline of philosophy,
is not so powerful or satisfying to someone outside the discipline, not socialized in its tradition. A
political activist, for example, might justify redistribution and equalizing opportunity quite directly,
without constructing an argument from moral foundations: "I have decided to ally myself with the
most disadvantaged people,” the activist could say. “I support their struggle against those
exploiting them, their aim of ending this exploitation and ensuring that it is not reconstituted." An
obvious moral philosophical response to the political partisan's stated sympathies is that they are
not a justification. The activist's synthetic statement must be broken down into basic principles so
that it is clear what "exploitation" and "alliance" mean, and what forms of "struggle" are
acceptable. How, moral philosophers would conclude, can we oppose injustice without a
justifiable account of justice?
Let me agree for now that a definition of justice is needed to oppose injustice. Indeed,
making any argument without recourse to foundationalist rhetoric is, in general, quite difficult.
Nevertheless, giving priority to moral justification while leaving the social context in the
background, scarcely analyzed, burdens our thinking about in/justice in several ways. In
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identifying these burdens or limitations my aim is to build a check-list of alternative requirements
for an account of in/justice that departs from two-step moral theory.
1) Individualism vs. socio-economic analysis. One reason given for unpacking synthetic
statements about injustice and for justifying rules of justice in terms of fundamental moral
principles is that, when these principles are clarified, people are able to base their actions and
design their institutions upon those principles. This reasoning implies a belief that action
originates in individuals, that people's actions are internally driven rather than shaped by the
structures of social life. In contrast to this individualist assumption, we might develop analyses of
how economic and social arrangements, including those related to gender, structure possibilities
for effective action, and of how those structures are reproduced (always imperfectly) through the
actions people take (Sewell 1992).
The significance of the contrast between individual and social based analysis can be
illustrated by criticizing a thought experiment that seems typical of moral philosophy. Feinberg
([1975], 1989, 113) claims that we would decline the devil's offer to live in utopia if the offer were
conditioned on accepting the eternal torture, even if out-of-sight, of just one individual. However,
every day we consume the fruits of labor carried out in political circumstances that involve
coercion, repression, and at times torture. In the devil's bargain the consequences are clear and
we can imagine being that one tortured individual. However, contrary to Feinberg's thought
experiment, when our view of the suffering individuals is obscured or refracted through complex
socio-economic pathways, our moral principles do not seem to be translatable into clear courses
of action.
2) Human nature vs. moral situatedness. The focus on individuals as the source of action
also tends to lead to an emphasis on the fundamental nature of people. We find elaborate
discussions of whether justice or, more generally, social cooperation can be based on selfinterest, or instead require some moral motivation irreducible to self-interest (Barry 1989). In
accounts where some moral motivation is needed, anxiety about the vulnerability of justice to
disruption by egoistic free-riders can be detected. Barry (1989), for example, bolsters his use of a
moral motivation by claiming that the dependency which every baby and child experience makes
it natural. From a different angle, communitarian and feminist moral theorists argue that selfinterest does not exist prior to and independently of the community we live in (Held 1987). Thus,
self-interest is not human nature; interdependency is fundamental and so morality and
cooperation are possible if the community creates the right circumstances.
The argument against equating human nature with self-interest can be extended,
however, in a way that shifts the emphasis away from human nature. Suppose we admit that
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societies are morally ambiguous, that self-interestedness and self-sacrifice are both observable
and we will not be able to find one original, later distorted, moral essence. This requires us to
examine the circumstances in which people act. For example, instead of explaining Mother
Theresa's charitable activities in terms of her saintliness, we might examine the institutions of the
Catholic Church in India that make a life of service to others possible. We might analyze the
forces pushing peasants from rural villages to urban slums that create the need for such charity.
Similarly, consider Lech Walesa, the trade unionist who risked his freedom and maybe his life in
the heyday of Solidarity, and compare him with Lech Walesa, who, as President of Poland
became increasingly autocratic. If we assumed that a fundamental change in personality
accounts for the shift, we would miss the opportunity to make sense of the enormous charges in
the situation in which Walesa has been acting. Of course, some people are generally more
egoistic than others, or seek out situations in which their self-interestedness predominates.
Nevertheless, speculating about some ahistorical, asocial human nature steers us away from an
interesting challenge, namely, to explain the existence and persistence of situations that inhibit or
facilitate moral actions.
3) Universality vs. partisanship in conflicts. Another reason for philosophical justification
of a conception of justice is to give it greater weight than our mere personal opinion. If rules of
justice can be shown to be based on widely held moral principles, then it would seem easier to
gain support for the implementation of justice. Indeed, the successes of organizations such as
Amnesty International and of campaigns for human rights lend credibility to the strategy of nonpartisan, universalist appeals to justice.
Universality is, however, a more complex issue. The search for universality often yields
abstract and quite unspecific principles. These have little power of implementation and provide
little insight about how to face the conflict of interests that characterize social life (see, in
contrast, Young 1990). Moral theory is weak on justification for taking sides and on examining
whose interests are spared from dispute by intellectuals attempting to stand apart from
partisanship. From a constructivist+ viewpoint, it would be interesting to examine the recent
historical record to discern the extent to which appeals to universal values gain significance only
when direct challenges to dominant interests are untenable, having been suppressed or
persistently ignored. In those circumstances, but not more generally, non-partisanship,
universality, individualism, and lack of socio-economic analysis might be an appropriate political
tactic, albeit representing a substantial accommodation to power.
4) Possessions vs. activities and relationships as the source of satisfaction. A further
accommodation, in this case to the prevailing patterns of ownership, production, and
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consumption, is evident in moral theory's emphasis on distribution of social goods. Rawls and
most of his critics are aware of the non-material sources of satisfaction and self-respect, yet the
model emerging from most moral theory is one of quantifiable, possessable and thus
distributable goods. Satisfactions embedded in activities and relationships, such as making
collective decisions, developing skills, and living healthily, are not well-addressed within the
"distributive paradigm" (Young 1990). Yet activities and relationships help generate the
conditions in which individuals can be said to have rights, to be given opportunities, and to be
able to exercise capacities. The static, ahistorical notion of possession of rights, opportunities,
capacities, when combined with the reduction of social and economic complexity to transactions
among individuals (or analogous units), provides little guidance about how to analyze on-going
social processes. The unitary materialist metric (embodied, for example, in the Difference
Principle) privileges self-interested choice, so that it can appear to be a fundamental
consideration in defining justice, even in accounts where self-interest is conceived of as an
obstacle to justice. Rawls' TJ framework, even after my reconstruction, reflects the dominance of
the model of possessable goods and economically "rational" individuals. (See Roberts 1979,
Marginson 1988, Watt 1988 and Young 1990 for more detailed critiques.)
5) Ideal speech situations vs. the blocking of inquiry. There is an affinity between moral
philosophers expounding fundamental moral principles to which all reasonable people could
agree, and Habermasians building social theory around an ideal of a power-free speech situation
(Habermas 1990; see also Ackerman 1980). The participants in the ideal speech situation are
free to bring any underlying commitments to the surface, into the dialogue; the participants in
Rawls' Original Position would have their particular interests blanked out by the Veil of Ignorance.
In both cases we are asked to imagine what it would be like if power were removed from
negotiations or transactions between people. The burden of this orientation is that our attention is
drawn away from the ways that people use their power to block inquiries into their particular
interests. Instead of developing an analysis of the intricacies of power-infused interactions, such
interactions become seen merely as a departure from the desired ideal situation, which remains
the focus of the moral/social philosophizing.
3. Toward a political theory of injustice
In listing of the burdens of building a theory of justice upon a basis of moral justification I
have foreshadowed alternative approaches to questions of justice and injustice. This by no
means amounts to an alternative theory, but it does indicate some of the dimensions of the
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project required. It should be clear that our attention needs to turn outwards, away from the
individual moral or rational actor, towards the processes of social production and reproduction
that facilitate or constrain action. The boundaries of relevant inquiries expand enormously,
perhaps disappearing over our intellectual horizons. The appropriate concepts and
methodologies for exploring the heterogeneous complexity of considerations are not obvious or
well developed. Furthermore, in the spirit of social constructivism, any claims of
"appropriateness" require us to consider the location, background, and favored actions of the
theory's expositor. The complexity of considerations then multiplies further.
This complexity leads me to withdraw my earlier concession that a definition of justice is
needed to oppose injustice. Clearly, it is not very helpful to command a football team simply to
move toward the touch-down line. There are many different sequences of coordinated moves by
the players that may achieve the same end result, each depending on the coordinated responses
of the other team to these moves. Similarly, once we accept that social and economic
arrangements are complex, involving conflict and the exercise of power, and that change
requires changes in social processes not just in possession of social goods, then a definition of
justice will not be very helpful. There can be no pre-set instructions for climbing a hill with justice
at the summit, for not only do individual actions and their collective summation change the shape
of the many-peaked landscape, but actions have manifold consequences, reverberating out
along different webs. Even the most abstract and elegant theory has little impact without its
expositor building in their work on diverse social and institutional arrangements, and, thus, at the
same time reproducing those arrangements. To march steadily toward an ideal of justice requires
us to ignore the web we are walking on and the baggage we are carrying. In fact, the most
general burden that moral philosophers carry may be a commitment to unitary rationality, for this
obstructs their appreciation of diverse and contingently constructed subjectivities. (Antifoundationalists, such as Fish 1989 advance a similar critique.)
Clearly these are bold, bald statements, and are unlikely, without a great deal more
argument, to move moral theorists to retool and alter radically their chosen enterprise. After all,
what I have called burdens can be interpreted as facilitating the actions of most moral theorists.
Moreover, overcoming the burdens of moral theory is not a matter of voluntarily choosing to
adopt the alternatives outlined here. Instead, it requires social reconstruction. Living, working,
and representing require any agent—intellectual or activist—to face many practical issues. From
the perspective of heterogeneous constructivism, we must harness many, diverse resources in
order to act and any resource, in turn, constrains future possibilities. Changing our lives, work,
and representations requires mobilizing different resources (Taylor 1992, 1995; contrasting with
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Fish’s 1989 resistance to a normative position). The project(s) of illuminating what you want to
call injustice, so you can oppose and undermine it, may be better served by articulating the many
interconnected practical issues. Given the political construction of injustice, substitution of moral
for political analysis mystifies the diverse processes involved in social change. And whom, to end
on a moral tone, does that serve?
Postscript
The essay was accepted for publication in the journal Social Epistemology, but various
contingencies delayed my submission of the final revised version. By the time this was ready, the
journal had changed its format to focus on book reviews, not articles; the essay remains
unpublished. The gap between acceptance and completion of revisions had provided more than
enough time for me to draw on a wider literature and refine my position, but I decided to preserve
the rhetorical position of newcomer-outsider. I drew reinforcement from Alisdair MacIntyre, who
in After Virtue (a work also criticizing moral philosophy for abstracting “arguments from social and
historical contexts of activity and enquiry”) observes that "much contemporary analytic writing
[consists of] passages of argument in which the most sophisticated logical and semantic
techniques available are deployed in order to secure maximal rigor alternate with passages
which seem to do no more than cobble together a set of loosely related arbitrary preferences"
(MacIntyre 1984, 267).
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